Milei's Revolution Is Under Siege

The real test is no longer whether Milei can reform Argentina, but whether Argentina’s institutions will let him.

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We are pleased to continue our new series: What is Happening in Argentina! Each month, Fighting for a Free Future Associate, Luke Lucas, will report for Voices for a Free Future on what has been happening under the world’s only libertarian presidency.

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It has been just over a month since Argentina appeared to be consolidating its transition from stabilisation to early recovery. Since then, March has marked a clear shift: the reform programme is no longer defined primarily by macroeconomic gains, but by political conflict, institutional pushback and emerging social strain.

After securing congressional approval in February, the courts suspended large parts of the reform due to potential constitutional violations relating to labour rights and union protections. The court’s objections are primarily concerned with Article 14 bis of the Argentine Constitution, which guarantees protection against arbitrary dismissal, union freedom and the right to strike. Judges have argued that Milei’s reforms conflict with the freedom of association (specifically with unions). As well as Article 14, under Article 75, Section 22 of the Argentine Constitution, Argentina gives constitutional status to international agreements such as the International Labour Organisation Convention 87 + 98, as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

The escalation and partial judicial halt of President Milei’s labour reform agenda mark an important turning point: what had been a legislative battle has now become a judicial one. If the courts are successful at blocking the reform, it will introduce significant uncertainty over the government’s ability to implement structural reform.

Despite the judicial resistance, Milei has doubled down on his reform programme. On March 1^st, he opened Congress with plans for tax cuts, electoral reform, judicial restructuring and further deregulation, all components of his much wider institutional overhaul. The president has, however, adopted a more aggressive stance toward opposition figures and institutions, signalling the early stages of a deepening political divide.

Alongside institutional reforms, Milei has accelerated ideological positioning in both security and foreign policy. The government is taking a more hardline stance by closely aligning with U.S. policy by designating major transnational criminal groups as terrorist organisations. Argentina has also announced its withdrawal from the World Health Organisation, but has undertaken an active schedule of international trips. By strengthening ties with ideologically aligned leaders and promoting a pro-market agenda, the government is increasingly signalling a realignment away from multilateral institutions and toward bilateral or ideological partnerships

Continuing his trend of lowering inflation and reducing poverty rates, macroeconomic indicators remain stable, but March has highlighted a growing social strain. Public confidence in Milei has slipped over the past month, as shown by declining approval ratings. This appears to be driven by a combination of factors: the social impact of austerity, disruption from strikes, and growing controversy from his reform agenda. Confidence has shifted from cautious optimism to conditional support, with much of the electorate weighing the costs of structural reform and economic improvement against immediate social costs.

However, falling approval ratings cannot be taken in isolation as dissatisfaction with Milei’s reform agenda. March carries significant symbolic weight for Argentina, marking the 50^th anniversary of the 1976 military coup that prompted mass demonstrations across the country. These commemorations are not merely historical observances but deeply embedded political and cultural events that mobilise large segments of society around social and human rights issues. As a result, heightened public activity may exaggerate the appearance of declining confidence when viewed through a purely political lens. At the same time, Milei’s administration is more revisionist in tone towards aspects of the dictatorship, and Milei himself is a controversial figure for questioning elements of the commonly accepted historical narrative. Taken together, falling approval ratings cannot be perceived as a simple referendum on the economic programme alone.

While earlier expectations pointed toward a transition into early recovery, it seems March represents a transition from economic stabilisation to institutional confrontation. Despite facing judicial resistance, political backlash and social pressure, Milei remains committed to deep structural change. The central question has shifted from whether reforms can pass to whether they can be sustained. After months of economic stability, macroeconomic stabilisation is no longer the main challenge; political durability is now the main challenge.

In the UK, similar reforms would not avoid confrontation, from the streets to the courts and from political conflict to procedural constraint. Margaret Thatcher illustrates this dynamic clearly: her programme of rapid liberalisation and workers’ reforms in the 1980s did not bypass institutional and social resistance, but instead transformed it into prolonged industrial conflict and political confrontation. Argentina’s current trajectory reflects a similar principle: the faster and more comprehensive the reforms, the more likely they are to provoke friction.

The real test is no longer whether Milei can reform Argentina, but whether Argentina’s institutions will let him.